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Preface 
 
 
Omar Imady 
 
We are presently entering what might be termed the ‘Day After’ 
phase (or phases) of the Syrian Uprising; a period when the 
uprising and all the wars it unleashed gradually give way to the 
harsh realities of demarcation lines, the challenges of 
reconstruction, and the astronomical bill of the war effort. The 
fact that this phase involves a regime ‘victory’ that could not 
have been achieved without the overwhelming support of Russia 
and Iran, means that the regime is unable to enforce its own 
conditions and must constantly negotiate with the Russians, and 
at times the Iranians, regarding the optimal way to exercise its 
authority. The US military presence which, at least presently, 
appears to be long term, adds additional pressure on the regime 
and restricts its capacity to expand its territory. In this issue of 
Syria Studies, we are pleased to share three studies that shed light 
on some of these complex layers of post-uprising Syria. 
In Syria’s Reconciliation Agreements, Raymond 
Hinnebusch and Omar Imady explore how the regime and the 
opposition interacted with the evolving idea of musalahat or 
‘reconciliations’. At first, when neither side could unseat the 
other, these reconciliations were in essence, truces which 
reflected the war of attrition. As the regime grew stronger, 
largely after the Russian intervention, the musalahat evolved 
into several more advanced types, all designed to break the 
rebels, yet significantly different in the extent to which the 
regime was willing to agree to a more balanced arrangement. 
Hinnebusch and Imady proceed to examine the more recent, and 
internationally sanctioned, ‘deconfliction zones’ and show how 
they are similar, and different, from previous arrangements. The 
critical trademark of all of this, from a governance perspective, 
is the fact that all these arrangements entail, in various degrees, 
the decentralisation of government authority. The paper ends 
with the ironic conclusion that the Syria that may emerge from 
all this extensive decentralisation may resemble in certain ways 
the very Syria the protesters back in 2011 were advocating. 
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In Syria’s Reconstruction Scramble – Muriel Asseburg 
& Khaled Yacoub Oweis, focus on whether or not Europe should 
put aside its current reservations and become involved in the 
reconstruction effort. Asseburg and Oweis show that the realities 
of the post-uprising phase are in sharp contradiction with any 
meaningful attempt at reconstruction. Any involvement at this 
stage would amount to reducing reconstruction to the mere 
rebuilding of physical infrastructure even as actual fighting 
continues and without any prospects to a political settlement. 
The authors further conclude that Europe should instead “… play 
the long game and develop leverage to make future contributions 
serve state and peace-building purposes.” 
In What the West Owes Syrians, Diana Bashur explores 
another significant post-uprising reality, Syrian refugees and the 
costs involved in hosting them by Western countries. Here 
Bashur is seeking to draw our attention to an important, yet 
largely ignored, correlation between the profit incurred through 
arms sales by Western countries to countries that have provided 
support to the armed opposition and the costs involved in hosting 
Syrian refugees in the West. Bashur eloquently contrasts the 
extent to which the West was enthusiastic about the Arab Spring 
with the significant increase in arms sales to the region by EU 
and the US, 23% and 300% respectively. Bashur leaves us with 
the sobering probability that some European politicians “… may 
have opted for a tradeoff: making their taxpayers shoulder the 
short-term cost of hosting refugees in exchange for profits to the 
arms industry.” 
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1 
Syria’s Reconciliation  
Agreements 
 
Raymond Hinnebusch & Omar Imady 
 
Local truces in the Syrian conflict, what the regime called 
reconciliation (muslaha) agreements and the great powers 
later termed de-escalation or deconfliction zones have varied, 
over time, largely according to the changing balance of 
power. They ranged from compromises in which after a cease 
fire opposition fighters remained involved in security and 
governance roles in their areas, to cases of virtual opposition 
surrender involving evacuations of fighters or even whole 
populations.  
 
The Context Shaping “Reconciliation:” the Changing 
Balance of Power  
The Syrian government and opposition forces had, from quite 
early on, negotiated truces in limited areas, but greater 
impetus was given to this by the growing incapacity of either 
side to win the war. The regime, facing manpower shortages 
that precluded the re-conquest of opposition areas, took the 
lead in trying, instead, to impose settlements piece by piece 
on the arenas on the margins of government controlled areas 
where opposition concentrations were most threatening. The 
truces reflected and formalized the reality of a war of 
attrition, in which advances were incremental and difficult to 
hold, tending to fragment control. Also, the failure of 
national level “top-down” political negotiations, notably 
Geneva II, led the third UN mediator, Stephan DeMistura to 
propose in November 2014 less ambitious bottom up local 
truces in order to reduce the violence and in the hope these 
would acquire momentum enabling the national level 
negotiations stalemate to be overcome (Beals 2017).  
The shifting balance of power tended to determine the 
pace and kind of agreement. In the Damascus area, the 
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regime benefited from the opposition’s fragmentation, 
inability to coordinate combined offensives and vulnerability 
to being picked off one by one. Populations became alienated 
as opposition fighters failed to shield people from the 
regime’s sieges and air assaults as well as by their infighting 
over control of supplies and access points, personal power 
and doctrinal differences (among Islamists) (Glass 2017; 
Lund, 2017b). Another factor was the co-optation of 
opposition FSA forces by Jordan and Turkey, to secure their 
borders and fight IS and the PYD rather than Asad. Most 
notably, the Russian intervention, the fall of Aleppo and 
Turkey’s realignment with Russia, giving up on the goal of 
overthrowing Asad, set up a certain bandwagoning toward 
the apparently winning regime side (Samaha 2017).  When 
surveyed as to why the opposition was accepting deals with 
the regime, respondents cited relief from sieges, bringing 
security, declining prospects of military victory over the 
regime and an opportunity to re-coup arms. (Turkmani and 
Kaldor 2014). After years of unrest, massacres and 
deadlocks, public opinion seemed to shift in favour of the 
security and safety that the regime could possibly better 
deliver (Lakitsch 2017).  
After its 2015 intervention, Russia’s strategy started 
to dominate the settlement process. Moscow proposed “de-
escalation/de-confliction zones” to contain the conflict. The 
medium-term goal would be something resembling post-civil 
war Bosnia, with government and opposition forces 
responsible for security in their own areas (Memorandum; 
Applying Bosnia Model). In the shorter term, getting the 
moderate fighters to accept de-escalation would in practice 
bring them to accept the Asad regime and, at times, allow 
them to be used against the jihadists. At the Astana meeting, 
13 armed factions, having suffered battlefield losses, 
especially in Aleppo and loss of backing from Turkey, were 
brought, albeit unwillingly, into the negotiations over what 
became the Astana agreement, (AP 2017). It specified four 
de-escalation zones-- northern Homs, Ghouta, south 
Daraa/Quneitra and Idlib and parts of neighbouring 
provinces. Not only would fighting stop in these areas, but 
the government was obliged to allow humanitarian aid, 
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restore public services and allow refugees to return; also 
having little choice, Damascus said that although it would 
abide by the agreement, it would continue fighting 
“terrorism” –a label it applies to all armed rebel groups. 
Opposition militants recognized the agreement aimed to split 
the FSA from the jihadists, thus divide the opposition to 
Asad’s benefit. Russia, Turkey and Iran were to provide 
forces to police the ceasefire, although agreement over the 
details was not reached. The Putin-Trump pact — detailed in 
a Memorandum of Principle for De-escalation in Southern 
Syria — was to establish a similar cease-fire between Syrian 
government forces and armed opposition in southern Syria 
that would maintain the existing division of control between 
the two sides, though, unlike Astana, it did not recognize any 
role for Iran, directly or indirectly (i.e. Hizbullah), in 
securing this agreement.   
In essence, the military opposition has come to terms 
with the fact that it had to separate from the jihadist groups 
and come to terms with a heavy Russian role and presence 
because the alternative was Iran, and that changing the Asad 
regime was, at the very least, no longer achievable in the 
short run. The ‘deconfliction zones’ constituted the only 
tangible ‘achievement’ the opposition could claim on the 
ground, since they were in theory areas which were not 
completely under government control, and yet under some 
form of international protection. Because these zones were 
only clearly defined in terms of the areas they cover, rather 
than in actual nature, both the regime and the opposition 
would inevitably attempt to impose their respective modes of 
governance and security.  
 
Regime Discourse 
The Syrian government professed to follow a policy of 
dialogue regarding political reform with all domestic parties 
“which rejected foreign interference and violence, “while 
combating foreign-backed” insurgencies. Following the 
failed Geneva II conference in which it claims the “foreign – 
backed opposition” excluded itself from the reform process, 
internal dialogue was asserted to be the only viable peaceful 
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exit from the conflict. (SANA 2014; nsnbc international, 
2014) 
 National reconciliation was a “strategic vision” 
articulated by President Bashar al-Asad (al-Baath 
Newspaper). The government established a Ministry of 
National Reconciliation in 2012 under Ali Haidar who 
claimed successful conclusion of 50 reconciliation projects 
as of September 30, 2015 (Stone 2016). The strategy was to 
separate the foreign fighters from Syrian fighters and the 
“terrorists” from moderate fighters who could be “brought to 
their senses” (Adleh and Favier 2017). He presented a benign 
representation of the process: the ministry selected 
influential local people to form a committee of reconciliation 
which contacted the fighters and offered safe passage out of 
the area for those fighters who refused reconciliation and 
amnesty for those who laid down their arms. The latter were 
invited to join the army and many, the regime claimed, did 
so. President Asad granted blanket amnesties eight times in 
the last five years for a total of about 20,000 former Syrian 
“mercenaries.” In July 2016, Asad issued Legislative Decree 
No. 15, the legal basis for ‘reconciliation,’ which included 
amnesty for those who ‘turn themselves in and lay down their 
weapons.’ (Ezzi, 2017). Opposition supporters were 
guaranteed the right to work with the (unarmed) Syrian 
internal opposition. The Syrian media conveyed the view that 
the people in opposition controlled areas wanted (SANA, Oct 
2015) to embrace national reconciliation, but were afraid of 
violent reprisal from terrorist organizations. Reconciliation 
would boost trust between citizens and officials, settle the 
legal status of youths who decided to lay down their 
weapons, address the issue of missing people, and enable 
humanitarian aid. “Reconciliations are doing very well now,” 
said President Asad’s adviser, Dr. Bouthaina Shaaban in 
2017. “And there are many areas in the pipeline. We feel that 
this is the best way to end the war.” (Glass 2017)  
 How does the regime see the cumulative outcome of 
reconciliation? Legislative Decree 107, on administrative de-
centralization, has been said to provide a potential framework 
for a post-conflict devolution of political authority that would  
allow all sides of the conflict to retain some degree of control 
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over the areas under their jurisdiction; yet, it also grants wide 
powers and to a presidential appointed governor at the 
province level (Aarabi 2017). Giving the present alternatives, 
that may well be an ideal outcome allowing at least some 
power-sharing. 
 
Regime Strategy 
However, People’s Assembly speaker Hadiyah Abbas gave a 
more realistic assessment in describing reconciliation as a 
way “to enhance the victories achieved by the Syrian Arab 
Army against the terrorist organizations.” (SANA, Sept 
2016). Indeed, sources close to the regime see reconciliation 
as part of a sophisticated regime survival strategy. This 
strategy combines negotiations with the opposition, with the 
unrestrained use of force, (relying on Russia for diplomatic 
protection at the UNSC against international reaction) 
reflecting the regime view that one can never negotiate from 
weakness. However, faced with manpower constraints, 
rather than risk significant regime causalities, the regime 
came to pursue a policy of siege and waiting until the villages 
or towns were finally ready to capitulate (which the older 
notables would pressure the fighters to accept.). The state 
security system, armed with intelligence files amassed over 
generations, knew its enemies and their vulnerabilities. 
Discovering that no tactic worked everywhere, the regime’s 
negotiators offered different kinds of deals in different areas; 
for example, those that demonstrated high resistance in 
fighting the regime faced total population removal and safe 
passage to rebel controlled areas (i.e. the Idlib governorate) 
(Glass 2017). Many deals concentrated on the peripheries of 
Damascus where the regime gradually expanded against 
rebel concentrations that were a threat to its nerve centre, but 
also in Homs, Aleppo and elsewhere (Beals 2017).  
The reconciliations were regarded from the very 
beginning as part of a war strategy rather than a 
genuine desire to move toward power-sharing: promises 
pertaining to administrative decentralization and the special 
privileges promised to notables of reconciled areas 
were reversed over time and loyalists were systematically 
reintroduced into these areas. Moreover, as the power 
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balance shifted its way, the regime’s determination to bring 
all Syrian territory back under its rule has been renewed. 
Regime media boasts that until recently the idea of a military 
victory was regarded as impossible to achieve but is no 
longer so and a return to a centralised government will be 
achieved (over time); only when it comes to the Kurdish 
areas does the regime exhibit uncertainty regarding the extent 
to which it can restore the old status quo. In private, regime 
connected figures admit the regime is reconciled to a 
continuing long struggle. Having achieved the upper hand on 
the ground at great cost, Asad has no interest in the 
concessions needed for a negotiated political transition.  
 Certainly, the opposition sees the regime’s 
reconciliation strategy as far from benign. Reconciliation 
deals do not amount to “reconciliation” but are either 
surrenders or temporary truces of convenience. In its most 
alarmist version, they are nothing less a plan for demographic 
re-engineering of Syria. Riyad Hassan Agha, of the Syrian 
opposition's Higher Negotiation Committee (HNC), sees it in 
these terms: make 12 million Syrians (predominantly Sunni) 
become displaced or refugees and force the remaining Sunnis 
of Damascus and the coast to accept their reduced role as a 
wounded minority which must show full allegiance. In 
parallel Iranian backed militias are introduced into areas 
where Sunni fighters depart as a strategy of Shia-ization 
(All4Syria Archive). 
 
“Reconciliation” in Action: Processes and Outcome Variations 
We can get a better idea of both government intentions and 
the constraints it faces by surveying the processes by which 
reconciliation deals have been reached and what their 
outcome has been. 
The negotiators for the government were army and 
intelligence officers as well as pro-regime residents of 
contested areas such as tribal or religious leaders, while the 
opposition side included fighters, council activists, religious 
leaders and notables. The regime could not simply dictate the 
terms: e.g. pro-Asad notables with roots in East Ghouta made 
repeated negotiating trips to Islam Army-held Douma (Lund 
2017a). Negotiations often broke down because the 
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government insisted on surrender or if less was demanded, 
spoilers, those profiting from checkpoints on both sides, but 
especially the hard-line local regime militias grouped in the 
National Defence Force (NDF) sometimes defied deals 
reached by government officials. In one instance, a 
reconciliation committee authorized by the government was 
killed by an Alawite militia. Bad faith and non-
implementation especially by the government deterred 
further agreements. Opposition groups might prolong the 
fighting to keep access to outside funding. When fighters 
were foreign or had no stake in the affected area, they were 
less responsive to civilian suffering and demands to end the 
fighting (Turkmani and Kaldor 2014). In 2016, the Russians 
set up their own Centre for reconciliation that claimed to 
broker 1479 truces, which, if true, marked a serious 
acceleration in their pace (Adleh and Favier 2017). 
 
Kinds of Agreements  
Kinds of agreement reflect not just the intentions of regime 
(and opposition) but the balance of power between them, and 
also factors such as whether a locale is strategic, its sectarian 
composition and the history of its role in the uprising.  
 
Type 1: The most unbalanced form of agreement leads to 
displacement of the entire population, (many of whom will 
have previously fled the area), perhaps in a population 
exchange such as occurred in the so-called four towns 
agreement wherein Shiite villages encircled by the 
opposition were evacuated in parallel to Sunni evacuations 
from the Kalamoun area, e.g. from Zebadani. This strategy, 
in opposition eyes, is based on forcing the inhabitants to 
relocate with a view towards creating demographic changes 
in a so-called “useful Syria.” (Ezzi 2017) 
In the case of Daraya, which was a platform for rebel 
attacks on regime-held Damascus and close to the Mezze 
military airport, not only was the population forced out, but 
also regime troops looted and razed the town. By contrast, 
the neighbouring town of Moadamiyah, which had been 
more defensive in the conflict, was treated more generously. 
Many Daraya fighters went to Idlib, but others relocated to a 
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new camp ten miles south of Damascus near Harjallah where 
new houses were built and free food, utilities, education and 
medical care were provided by the Red Crescent. Said one 
fighter: “We were given a choice. …when I came here, 
…everyone said the regime would take me to prison.” 
Evidently, this did not happen (Glass 2017). In some places, 
a Sunni-Alawite sectarian faultline influenced the regime's 
approach: Homs centre city and al-Waer, rebellious Sunni 
areas, both suffered population evacuation, shifting the 
demographic balance in favour of Alawites.  
 
Type 2: A somewhat less punitive deal required opposition 
fighters and activists to submit in return for lifting of sieges 
and restoring services but without large-scale population 
displacement. This version of ‘reconciliation’ was 
implemented in Qudsaya, Al-Hama, Al-Tal, Madaya, and the 
suburbs of eastern Damascus, among others. Anyone who 
was armed and did not accept government conditions was 
expelled. Submissive elements of the former armed 
opposition were absorbed into the regime’s local militias. 
The opposition’s local councils were dismantled since, 
offering an alternative to state institutions, they were seen as 
a threat to restoration of regime authority in rebel areas. 
Members of the reconciliation delegation, traditional 
dignitaries, merchants and clerics loyal to the official 
religious establishment become local leaders with temporary 
authority. Significantly, these deals allowed former Islamist 
clerics to be co-opted: e.g. in the town of Yalda in the 
southern Damascus countryside, the Imam of Masjid al-
Saliheen after having been a judge in a Sharia court of the 
Islamist factions, joined the government side as did the Imam 
of the Beit Sahem Great Mosque, who was the commander 
of Liwa Sham al-Rasoul’s Saraya al-Sham. Through the 
former Mufti of Rif Dimashq, Sheikh Muhammad Adnan 
Afiouni, a disciple of the late Shaikh Ahmad Kaftaru, the 
regime rehabilitated them and gave them guarantees that they 
would not be prosecuted in return for their support for the 
policy of ‘reconciliation’. They were transformed into 
mediators between the people and the state. Although sieges 
were lifted in these cases, local humanitarian networks that 
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had hitherto channelled aid from abroad were dismantled, as 
the government considered such delivery of aid to opposition 
areas a violation of its sovereignty. Now aid flowed only 
through government-affiliated channels where it might be 
diverted to loyalist hands or lost through corruption. The 
regime sometimes reneged on its promises to deliver 
services; in Al-Tal, electricity was not restored and there 
were arbitrary arrests by the pro-regime Qalamoun Shield 
militia.  The regime managed to co-opt some FSA fighters 
into its National Defence Forces, capitalizing on infighting 
and grievances between opposition groups. But in many 
‘reconciliation’ areas, the regime began imposing mandatory 
conscription (Adleh and Favier 2016; Ezzi 2017). 
 
Type 3: The third type of agreement was more balanced as 
dictated by a power balance between regime and opposition. 
Under this type of deal rebels maintained control of their 
areas in return for handing over heavy weaponry and halting 
attacks on regime forces; in return, sieges were lifted, return 
of the displaced and restoration of public utilities allowed 
(Hamlo 2015). The first agreement in Barzeh of June 2014 
was along these lines and much more favourable to the 
opposition than other deals owing to the fact that it was a 
strategic location the government needed to recover but had 
not been able to do so militarily, suffering many casualties; 
as such, it pushed for a ceasefire to neutralize this front. FSA 
fighters remained in control of their area, nominally 
transformed into a regime-sanctioned “popular army” 
charged with maintaining security, and the army pulled back 
to allow civilians to return, with the road to Damascus being 
opened (Turkmani and Kaldor 2014). Later, however in May 
2017, hundreds of rebels and their families were also 
evacuated after they decided to lay down their arms and leave 
to rebel-held Idlib province. 
A similar deal was reached in 2014 in Jiroud, which 
thereafter remained peaceful. The deal was characterized by 
an opposition activist as a “temporary truce” that served the 
interests of the opposing sides. The government wanted to 
reduce the number of fronts in which it is engaged and the 
(pro-opposition) inhabitants of Jiroud sought to spare their 
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town. In his words, “The government will have to exercise 
self-restraint …because they cannot afford to reignite those 
fronts since the army is overstretched in such hotspots as 
Idlib, Daraa and Aleppo” (Hamlo 2015). 
Al-Sanamayn in Daraa muhafazat was a model for 
how the regime sought to deal, at minimum cost, with the 
wider rebel-held south. It was strategic, being home to an 
important base of the Syrian army's 9th division and a 
gateway between Daraa and opposition areas of the Ghouta. 
Much of the town fell out of regime control and opposition 
local councils were set up, though most of the public services 
were still provided by the regime. The regime laid siege to 
the opposition-controlled neighbourhoods which was lifted 
under an agreement that the rebels would not attack regime 
positions or personnel. Some (not all) weapons were handed 
over but no fighters were compelled to leave. The regime's 
security forces did not intervene in security and criminal 
incidents in the town, allowing the armed factions to deal 
with these matters: if the regime arrested someone's relatives, 
that person would retaliate by kidnapping military personnel 
or firing on a military zone. With all clans armed for self-
defence, there was much lawlessness. Rather than 
conscription, the regime tried to recruit to the new Fifth Corp 
by offering substantial benefits. Facing manpower shortages, 
the regime saw this as a model for how to deal with the South; 
but it would not work in areas with a strong jihadi presence 
(Tamimi 2017).  
 
Type 4: A fourth type of agreement resulted where the 
opposition bargaining position rested on its control of a 
resource crucial to the government. In Wadi Barada, the truce 
stipulated that the government forces would not interfere in 
the town at all, in return for secure pumping of drinking water 
to Damascus from al-Fija spring; “The rebels cut off water 
supply to Damascus more than once, blackmailing the 
government until the latter agreed to their demands, which 
were mostly about releasing prisoners from the regime’s 
jails,” Eventually, however, the government invaded and 
took over the Wadi area. Similarly, rebel groups seized 
control of gas pipelines in the town of Mahsa, which supplied 
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power plants in Damascus, using it to extort money from the 
government or to win the release of prisoners. In Aleppo 
control of the city’s thermal power plant was the object of 
practical agreement between regime and opposition (Hamlo 
2015;. Turkmani and Kaldor 2014).  
 
Consequences of the Agreements 
Local reconciliation agreements have delivered humanitarian 
improvements and local peace that top down efforts failed to 
deliver. In the short term, Syrians accept them to get relief 
from war, but in the long term, obstacles to true 
reconciliation include government policies of forced 
conscription and displacement, loss of property of displaced, 
razing of informal settlements and lack of regime release of 
detainees (Adleh and Favier 2017).   
 Despite the regime’s expressed aim of restoring 
centralized rule over Syria, this is impractical in the medium 
term, and indeed, even in government controlled areas, 
power has become de-centralized to local strongmen, in a 
way not too different from the 3rd and 4th type of agreements 
with opposition areas. The last six years have created a 
culture of self-governance not only in areas that were outside 
of regime control, but even in areas like the coast and 
Damascus; a culture which the regime will have to adapt to. 
Indeed, it is in areas that remained under regime control that 
the regime will find it the most challenging to restore 
(assuming it actually desires to) to pre-uprising modes of 
governance. Millions of Syrians learned how to carry out 
their daily lives during periods when the government was far 
too preoccupied to deliver its previous services. These new 
survival skills often meant the rise of new organizations that 
the government tolerates because they are not politicized and 
are focused entirely on fulfilling functions that the 
government is too over stretched to carry out. 
 Local agreements need, however, to be incorporated 
into a comprehensive peace settlement; otherwise they will 
be mere war tactics used to neutralize one area so fighting is 
easier elsewhere. (Turkmani) and will not deliver anything 
like reconciliation. Russian proposals seem to aim at just this 
and if they are realized would mean, in practice, a new more 
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decentralized but also more lawless order for the medium 
term. As the situation stands today, the regime appears to 
have not only proven it can achieve a partial military victory, 
but also that the only type of changes it is willing to tolerate 
are those decentralized forms of governance that are taking 
place within the framework of reconciliations. These 
changes, however, insignificant as they may presently seem, 
strike at the very nature of pre-2011 Syria, and hence, 
ironically, what appears now as evidence of government 
triumph may eventually prove to be the foundation of a Syria 
not too different than that which the initial protests aspired to 
reach. 
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2 
Syria’s Reconstruction  
Scramble1 
 
Muriel Asseburg & Khaled Yacoub Oweis 
 
Introduction 
In the second half of 2017, as the civil war abated and the so-
called Islamic State (IS) was all but defeated, Moscow 
increased its efforts to reach what it regards as conflict 
resolution in several fora beyond the UN-led Geneva process. 
Moreover, as the US administration made it clear that it 
would not be engaging in reconstruction efforts, Russia has 
sought European financial assistance to help cover the costs 
of rebuilding the country, together with Arab Gulf states. 
Although the European Union had, in April 2017, ruled out 
support for reconstruction without a political transition, calls 
have now been mounting in Europe to accommodate Bashar 
al-Asad, help in the reconstruction of Syria, and send back 
refugees. Yet, the fighting is far from over. More 
importantly, the mere reconstruction of physical 
infrastructure would do little to instill stability, but would 
rather raise the risk of fueling new conflicts. Europeans 
should therefore make clear to Russia that they will stick with 
their own approach. They should play the long game and 
develop leverage to make future contributions serve state- 
and peace-building purposes. Meanwhile, they should focus 
on increased levels of humanitarian aid, early recovery 
measures, such as de-mining and restoring basic water and 
health infrastructure, building human capital in Syria and 
among Syrian refugee communities, in addition to 
concentrating on civil society and local governance support 
where they have credible partners.  
 
A New Phase of the Conflict 
By late 2017, the Syrian regime and its allies had regained 
control over most of the urban centers in the country, and the 
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Caliphate proclaimed by the IS had all but lost its territorial 
base. The rebels had been mainly squeezed into several 
pockets but were still holding onto strategic junctures and 
main border crossings.2 At the same time, ever since its direct 
military involvement in Syria, Russia has developed into the 
dominant military force. Moscow has been keen to translate 
that achievement into taking the lead on the diplomatic stage 
and acting as mediator in the conflict. Washington, whose 
interest in Syria since 2014 has been limited largely to 
combating the IS, has been unwilling to challenge the 
Russian approach. Nor has it shown willingness to contribute 
meaningfully to Syria’s reconstruction after its heavy 
bombing of Syria’s east. Russian bombardment, especially of 
Aleppo in 2016, caused wide-scale destruction, drawing 
strong EU condemnation for the “deliberate targeting of 
hospitals, medical personnel, schools and essential 
infrastructure” (Emmott, 2016). Yet, Moscow has turned to 
Europe for reconstruction support while chiding European 
countries for linking reconstruction to a political transition 
and predicted the conflict would soon be over. De-escalation 
was portrayed as having created the “de facto conditions” for 
full-scale reconstruction in Syria. Today’s reality, however, 
looks different, with control still very much fragmented 
between a variety of forces on the ground in the deescalation 
zones, the territories liberated from the IS, the areas 
controlled by the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), as 
well as those areas under the control of the regime and its 
allies – with the fighting doing anything but drawing to a 
close.  
 
De-escalation Zones  
Moscow first used its military backing mainly to help the 
regime and its allies reconquer territories. Over the course of 
2017, it aimed at reducing the levels of violence through a 
new approach that was to prepare the ground for pacification. 
In this vein, in the Kazakhstani capital, Astana, in May 2017, 
Russia agreed with Turkey and Iran on so-called de-
escalation zones in regions held by various rebel forces. The 
deal was supposed to result in a halt to fighting in places 
where the revolt had not been crushed, offering the 
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possibility of sustained humanitarian relief and the 
restoration of basic services.  
The Russia–Iran–Turkey deal stipulated ceasefires in 
four de-escalation zones, the halt of airstrikes, “rapid, safe, 
and unhindered” humanitarian access, the restoration of 
basic infrastructure, and the creation of conditions for the 
voluntary return of internally displaced persons (IDPs). The 
fight against jihadists would still continue in the zones, with 
attacks on the IS and HTS, an al-Qaeda offshoot, being 
exempted from the ceasefires. The zones comprise: 1. the 
north: Idlib province and parts of Aleppo, Latakia, and Hama 
governorates on the border with Turkey; 2. Homs: rural areas 
north of the city of Homs; 3. the Eastern Ghouta, i.e., the 
eastern suburbs of Damascus; and 4. a southwestern zone in 
areas adjacent to Jordan and the Israeli-occupied Golan 
Heights. Out of the four zones, the Damascus and Homs 
zones in the center of the country have been besieged by the 
regime. The three guarantors were to deploy military 
observers to see through the implementation of the ceasefire 
agreements (Syria’s de-escalation zones explained, 2017). 
In reality, the zones have evolved to present an array of 
local situations: from improved living conditions to the 
continued siege and massive carnage caused by the regime’s 
and Russia’s bombings of civilian targets in areas that 
Moscow had marked as being part of the de-escalation 
zones. For Asad, the zones were considered to be a 
temporary arrangement, if at all, and were to follow the path 
of other besieged areas that the regime had captured after 
“terrorists” (which is the regime’s term for all rebels) were 
given the chance to disarm and “return to the bosom of the 
state.” By early 2018, the Eastern Ghouta and Idlib de-
escalation zones had effectively broken down. 
 
Makings of a Mini-recovery  
At the same time, bombing and sieges on areas in other zones 
abated, most notably in the countryside near Homs and in the 
southern governorate of Daraa. The window of temporary 
stability spurred fairly brisk activity in the private 
construction sphere. For example, some residents in rural 
Homs moved back to their hometowns from camps in nearby 
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farmlands and started to repair or rebuild their houses. Mud 
is reportedly being used instead of concrete, as prices for 
construction materials imported from regime areas remain 
high. The cost of most other goods and staples, such as sugar 
and rice, has fallen since the de-escalation deal came into 
effect in August 2017, breaking the monopolies of local 
traders, who had enjoyed a captive market. Two crossings 
with the regime opened, increasing the overall level of 
supplies. An export market slowly opened, too. Rebel areas 
sent sheep and cattle to regime areas, and the number of 
farmers who planned to plant crops increased, as they 
expected large enough sales to make a profit.  
The potential of improved access could also rejuvenate 
the local councils, which activists had set up during the 
revolt to replace the regime’s administration after Asad’s 
forces withdrew from rebellious areas. The councils in rural 
Homs are now seeking to link up with donors and with the 
opposition’s interim government. At the same time, the siege 
of the region may have been a blessing in disguise for the 
local structures, isolating them from outside meddling. In the 
southern governorate of Daraa, local activists see the reach 
of Jordan and other Arab countries as having tainted local 
governance structures. Figures linked to third countries 
penetrated or took over many of the local councils, 
undermining their merit and competence.3  
 
Al-Qaeda Lurks  
Apart from continued regime bombings and the threat of the 
regime attempting to reconquer further rebel areas, the 
highest hurdles to potential reconstruction in the de-
escalation zones come from within. By August 2017, 
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, or the Association for the 
Liberation of the Levant) – an offshoot of al-Qaeda and 
successor of the Nusra Front – all but finished off its Salafist 
rival, Ahrar al-Sham, and took control over most of the Idlib 
province.  
The area of influence of HTS also included the main 
border crossing with Turkey, through which flows 
humanitarian aid and infrastructure supplies. Borrowing 
from Lenin’s dictum of “peace, land and bread,” HTS took 
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over the bakeries in the various towns across Idlib, many of 
which relied on Western programs for wheat supply. Keen 
to build up legitimacy with the local population and be seen 
as succeeding in governance, HTS indicated that it would not 
prevent outside assistance to Idlib (Bulos, 2017).  
At the same time, the group had its hand in many of the 
local administrative structures, as well as schools, charities, 
and refugee camps, without necessarily staffing them 
outright with its members or conspicuously patrolling them. 
HTS also dissolved local councils or ousted council 
members who were critical of the group. In addition, they 
co-opted existing supervisory bodies, such as the Idlib 
Administrative Board, or nudged civilian allies to set up new 
ones. Among them is the so-called Syrian Salvation 
Government, formed in November 2017, with the apparent 
aim of displacing the opposition’s interim government. 
Many qualified cadres in the various local administrations of 
Idlib remained in their posts despite their distaste of HTS. 
They preferred to hold onto their jobs and their links to 
donors to keep aid deliveries going.  
Western support for Idlib’s population, in contrast, 
abated markedly after HTS’ takeover, as foreign donors 
were anxious about indirectly supporting the group or its 
front organizations. Activists had hoped that the entry of 
Turkish troops into Idlib in October 2017 would roll back 
HTS. The Turkish show of force was mandated by the 
implementation of the northern de-escalation zone foreseen 
in the Astana agreement. Yet, it was aimed at the Kurdish 
People’s Protection Units (YPG) militia, which is linked to 
the PYD, a Syrian offshoot of the Turkish Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK) in the nearby region of Afrin; this was 
done with the goal of preventing a contiguous Kurdish self-
administration zone along the Turkish border.  
The risk, however, of renewed warfare in the zone 
remained high, with Turkey and Iran raising the tone of their 
assertive rhetoric. Ankara, boosted by its newfound 
understandings with Russia, said it needed to clear Afrin of 
the YPG and started another military operation dubbed 
“olive branch” in January 2018 after the US government 
had announced it would help set up a border force manned 
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by 30,000 Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) fighters. 
Earlier, in December 2018, the Asad regime had started a 
military campaign in Southern Idlib and Hama provinces, 
aimed at reconquering strategic assets from the jihadists 
there.  
The mostly Kurdish Afrin region has an estimated 
300,000 inhabitants living in 20 cities and towns, whereas 
Idlib province has an estimated two million people, of 
whom one-third have been displaced there from other 
provinces. They settled in Idlib after fleeing fighting 
elsewhere in the country because Turkey had closed its 
border to refugees. Also, thousands of rebel fighters, their 
families, and other civilians were transported to the 
province in the regime’s “green buses,” which became 
synonymous with the population transfers that 
accompanied rebel surrenders in besieged areas under so-
called reconciliation agreements.  
 
Kurdish Expansion  
Signs have emerged of an overreach by the PYD, in 
particular after the United States encouraged the capture of 
mostly Arab inhabited territories in eastern Syria from the IS 
by the SDF, which are dominated by the YPG, the PYD’s 
fighters. In addition, the PYD’s declared goal of linking two 
contiguous self-rule areas (the so-called cantons of Jazeera 
and Kobanê) with the Afrin canton also appeared to be 
farfetched. By late 2017, it became clear that the United 
States (and Russia) would not back the Syrian Kurds’ 
political ambitions against Turkey beyond combating the IS; 
nor would Russia prevent the regime from recapturing 
territories liberated from the IS.  
The PYD has set up local governance structures in these 
areas. Although these structures of “people’s democracy” 
are nominally independent and inclusive, the PYD remains 
the power behind the scenes. One such arrangement has been 
installed in the mostly Arab town of Manbij, which the YPG 
captured from the IS in August 2016. The PYD appointed 
Farouk al-Mashi, a tribal figure, as the joint head of the 
Manbij City Council. The appointment invited scorn by 
opposition activists on social media, who compared the 
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PYD’s methods of coercion and control to that of the regime. 
They also pointed out that al-Mashi was the son of Diab al-
Mashi, a member of the rubber stamp Syrian parliament 
from 1954 till his death in 2009.  
 
Pay-up Time for the Regime  
Even though the Asad regime by no means controlled the 
entirety of Syria’s territory, it sensed the winds in its favor. 
It sought to employ reconstruction to placate its 
constituencies and compensate for the thousands who had 
died fighting for Asad. At the opening of the Damascus 
International Trade Fair in August 2017, an Asad aide said 
Syria had “made a U-turn” and was on the path of rebuilding 
(Reuters, 2017). The regime portrayed reconstruction as a 
done deal and announced that no contracts would go to 
countries that had supported what it regards as terrorism.  
Domestically, the authorities indicated that the 
rebuilding effort would reward mainly Asad’s loyalists; it 
was not an attempt to mitigate the grievances that had fueled 
the revolt by addressing issues related to institutional 
legitimacy and capacity, justice, and political and social 
inclusion. At an official rally in November 2017 – held to 
mark the coup that brought Hafez al-Asad to power more 
than four decades earlier – a senior Baath Party operative 
boasted that Syria would be “built with the hands of its 
honorable sons” (SANA, 2017). The rally was held in Homs, 
from which the regime and Iran-backed militias had 
displaced hundreds of thousands of mainly Sunni inhabitants 
as they crushed the rebellion there. Of the 8 billion Syrian 
pounds ($15.5 million) that the government announced in 
July 2017 would be allocated to projects in Homs 
governorate, most of it went to Alawite and Christian 
communities as opposed to Sunni areas destroyed by regime 
bombing. 
So far, the regime has, at least on paper, awarded 
projects to its cronies and struck initial agreements with Iran 
(Sharafedin/Francis, 2017) and Russia. The deals range from 
residential towers and a shopping center to be built on 
bulldozed homes in Damascus that had belonged to pro-
democracy demonstrators, to a cellphone license and oil 
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refinery in Homs, and energy and mining concessions in 
eastern Syria. The regime apparently hopes to play the 
external powers against each other in the hopes that they will 
cough up the cash for hardcore infrastructure projects 
requiring long-term investment.  
 
International Blueprints 
As the civil war in Syria was seen as coming to an end, UN 
agencies, development organizations, and international 
finance institutions have drawn up a wealth of reconstruction 
blueprints for the country.4 According to UN estimates, 
reconstruction would cost at least $250 billion (UNOG, 
2017). What unites most of these plans is that they deal with 
reconstruction mostly as if it were a technical issue, whereas 
not much attention is being paid to the kind of governance 
system under which it is supposed to take place. Rather, a 
competent central authority oriented toward the public good 
– able and willing to engage in an equitable restoration of 
human capital and the social fabric – is just assumed.  
Also, these plans do not detail how a competitive 
business environment would be instilled – under the same 
regime that deprived most Syrians of equal opportunity for 
decades. With the courts and bureaucracy beholden to the 
kleptocracy, foreign companies have barely been able to 
operate in Syria or to win or execute major contracts without 
partnering with the ruling elites or their agents. If anyone 
who is not in league with the regime comes close to winning 
a tender, rules are arbitrarily changed and they are 
disqualified. Cartels and rackets run by the top tiers of the 
security apparatus abound. The judiciary and regulatory 
bodies are massively rigged. Ministries and the central bank 
act as private instruments for the Makhloufs, who are Asad’s 
cousins on his mother’s side. The Makhloufs and two other 
branches of the Asad family have the public tenders and 
procurement system locked up between them.  
What is more, most of these plans assume that Syria 
would work as a unitary state and do not account for the 
fragmentation that has resulted from the civil war. The 
fluidity of local dynamics, the emergence of new power 
brokers, and militia rule are all ignored. Among the forces 
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that emerged during the civil war is a new breed of crony 
capitalists, shaping the business environment and poised to 
obstruct – together with more established regime business 
figures – any reconstruction that is not in their favor. Also 
linked to the war economy are jihadists and other militia 
seeking to maximize their returns. In regime areas, organized 
crime and gang violence linked to various pro-Asad militia 
have spiked. Loyalists have targeted other loyalists in their 
quest for loot while cutting off roads and imposing tolls.  
 
Third parties’ motives  
International reconstruction blueprints also take for granted 
cooperation between third countries for the good of Syria. In 
reality, however, many of the regional and international 
players see reconstruction as a means to consolidate their 
presence in Syria in the long term and as a tool to assert their 
(vital) interests in the broader power struggles of the Middle 
East (Berti, 2017). They also tend to focus on their 
immediate interests, such as quick financial returns or 
alleviating themselves of Syrian refugees.  
The regime reportedly promised at least one Russian 
company linked to Russian security contractors a quarter of 
the oil and gas in the fields captured from the IS (Kramer, 
2017). Iran has encouraged private investment in real estate 
in Syria and signed memorandums of understanding for 
reconstruction in Aleppo as well as the restoration of mobile 
communications, which would bring in revenues and give 
them a surveillance edge. Ankara, officially shut out by the 
regime, has repaired basic infrastructure, schools, and a 
hospital in the Turkish-controlled enclave of al-Bab (Khatib, 
2017). Along with the more crucial absence of airstrikes, the 
rehabilitation has contributed to the return of some of the 
population into the small enclave. China has said it would 
also get involved in reconstruction, but it has not provided 
any specifics.  
The European Union and the United States have 
invested billions of dollars in humanitarian aid and 
stabilization in opposition-held areas. The Europeans see 
their work in Syria as being different from that of the 
Americans, in that they generally aim at building 
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streamlined institutions across a multitude of regions and 
support civil society, whereas the United States prefers to 
work with individual actors to set up and test organizations 
that would act as a role model to be followed in other areas.  
 
Outlook, Risks, and Dilemmas for the EU  
Under various short- to mid-term scenarios (Mejnders/van 
der Lijn/ van Mierlo, 2017), the violence is not expected to 
halt, and militia rule and the war economy are set to remain 
entrenched. Still, European policymakers are under pressure 
to focus on what can be done immediately to help foster a 
settlement and stabilize the region, not least in view of the 
urgency they feel due to rising populism in the EU and the 
pressure to repatriate refugees.  
Asad will happily take more freebies from the EU. For 
the regime, reconstruction is to serve, first and foremost, its 
own consolidation as well as ensure the permanence of 
social and demographic shifts and strengthen the loyalty of 
its citizens. A view espoused by the Asad regime and echoed 
in international aid meetings warns that Europe will lose out 
to Moscow and Tehran unless European nations help in the 
reconstruction of Syria.  
In April 2017, the EU ruled out engaging in 
reconstruction “until a comprehensive, genuine and 
inclusive political transition … is firmly under way” 
(European Council, 2017). Still, in practice, the European 
approach has been inconsistent – European countries have 
financed UN rebuilding programs that work in collaboration 
with the regime. The programs are ongoing or slated to start 
in regions where the dust has barely settled on forced 
population transfers, such as in Homs. No safeguards were 
devised to ensure the right of return for the original 
inhabitants, the halt of the falsification of public records, or 
a reversal of the regime’s confiscation of property in rebel 
districts it had captured. Also, the EU has not made the 
departure of Asad a precondition for engaging in 
reconstruction efforts. Rather, EU member states’ 
representatives have increasingly acknowledged that Bashar 
al-Asad might well play a role in the transition period, and 
even beyond. EU member states have been divided between 
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those taking a stance against any cooperation with what they 
regard as a regime that cannot be reformed, and those willing 
to placate Asad in the hope of quick stabilization or of 
opening a supposedly lucrative reconstruction market to 
their companies and development agencies. Consequently, 
the EU has shied away from spelling out if a genuine 
transition would be possible if Asad and his immediate 
entourage were to remain in power.  
Reconstruction thus poses a dilemma for the EU and its 
member states, as the chances for any real change to Syria’s 
authoritarian and repressive system are fading. Indeed, the 
Russian approach and the emergence of an emboldened 
Asad regime have complicated the realization of a European 
strategy on reconstruction. Moscow has portrayed its 
activities as being complementary to the UN Special 
Envoy’s efforts at achieving a negotiated conflict settlement 
based on the 2012 Geneva Agreement and UN Security 
Council Resolution 2254 of December 2015. But the 
Russian way has undermined the approach and list of 
priorities agreed upon in Resolution 2254 (UNSC, 2015), the 
centerpiece of which was supposed to be a transitional 
governing body – comprised of regime and opposition 
representatives – with full authority. Rather, Russia has 
sought legitimization of the Asad regime by leading a 
process of limited reform legitimized by a Conference of the 
Syrian Peoples or national dialogue conference held in late 
January 2018, followed by elections.  
 
Conclusions and Recommendations  
The Russian-dominated conflict-settlement approach and 
the expected continued presence of Iran-backed militias is 
unlikely to bring about even a minimum of the security, 
administrative, and economic reforms that would address 
Syria’s deep-rooted socio-economic and sectarian 
imbalances. Reconstruction cannot, as Russia implies, be 
reduced to the physical reconstruction of infrastructure and 
economic recovery. Rather, measures to safeguard citizens’ 
security, establish effective governance, and lay the ground 
for reconciliation are key for peace-building.  
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Experts widely agree that the following conditions need 
to be fulfilled to allow for reconstruction that serves 
peacebuilding: 1. an effective division of power with 
functioning checks and balances; the establishment of 
effective economic and administrative oversight bodies; 2. 
large-scale demilitarization; an end to militia and warlord 
rule; establishing army and security services loyal to the 
state and its citizenry, not to the regime; comprehensive 
disarmament of militias; 3. addressing forced displacement 
and expropriation of property; allowing for social 
reconciliation; 4. an inclusive constitutional process in 
which majority and minority rights are respected; a political 
climate in which free and fair elections are possible, political 
rights are guaranteed, and civil society can operate. 
In the absence of reforms leading to such favorable 
circumstances, European involvement in reconstruction runs 
the risk of feeding destructive dynamics and foregoing 
incentives for political settlement (Heller, 2017). The 
Europeans should therefore stick to the approach outlined in 
the April 2017 strategy, and clearly say so. They should also 
gauge when to throw around their weight and leverage their 
diplomatic, financial, and technical support to achieve 
conditions under which reconstruction would serve long-
term stabilization rather than lead to renewed violent conflict 
and radicalization.  
At a later stage – and because of the sheer amount of 
investment needed – the regime will not be able to depend 
only on its allies, as it has boasted. Rather, it might be forced 
to turn to Western, Gulf, and international sources of 
financing. That might be the starting point for pushing 
toward the realization of measures aimed at building credible 
institutions. One should not exaggerate the chances of 
success (Heydemann, 2017): Such a development is by no 
means guaranteed, as the regime might choose to continue 
defying European conditionality, even if it comes at the cost 
of massive North Korean-style human suffering.  
In the near future, some of the de-escalation zones could 
become the settings for larger European efforts at recovery 
– under the condition that the arrangements stick, which is 
more likely for some areas (in the south and north of Homs) 
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than for others (Eastern Ghouta and Idlib). The challenge in 
these zones is that some of the areas are controlled by forces 
that cannot be partners in reconstruction, such as al-Qaeda 
linked groups, meaning that support can only be 
administered through civil society organizations rather than 
the local councils and the interim government. Also, the 
rebels are often so fragmented in terms of actual control that 
no zone-wide de-escalation projects can be administered. 
Europeans will therefore have to look for tailor-made 
approaches, depending on the conditions and partners 
available in each of the areas. These approaches should focus 
on humanitarian aid, early recovery, and support for non-
violent community-based organizations – not least to 
counter jihadists’ propaganda and influence – as well as 
continued support for local governance, where possible. It is 
far-fetched to believe that with such kinds of support, one 
would be able to create “islands of stability,” which could be 
the basis for nation-wide stabilization. But Europeans should 
still strive toward helping local civilian and governance 
structures survive. 
Humanitarian aid, the provision of basic services, and 
support for civil society should also be the focus of European 
support in the PYD-controlled areas, where repression of 
opposition forces and independent activists and forced 
recruitment have become major problems, despite the 
progressive and inclusive image projected by the PYD.  
Last but not least, rather than thinking about sending 
refugees back to situations where their lives and existence are 
threatened, Europeans should focus more on building Syria’s 
human resources in the neighboring countries and among the 
refugee communities across Europe. 
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1 An earlier version was published as Asseburg, M. / Oweis, K. Y. (2017). Syria’s 
Reconstruction Scramble. In a Game Fraught with Political Risk, Europe Should Aim for 
Long-term Stabilization. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, December 2017. 
Retrieved from: https://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2017C51_ass_ows.pdf. 
2 See for example the maps of territorial control at Omran for Strategic Studies, 2017. 
3 Information provided in these paragraphs based on authors’ interviews with local activists. 
4 For an overview and analysis of some of these documents see Cordesman, 2017. 
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3 
What the West Owes Syrians: 
US and European Arms Sales to the 
Middle East 2011-20141 
 
Diana Bashur 
 
While the last two years have seen heated discussions in 
Europe and the US about the costs of hosting Syrian and other 
refugees, debate is lacking about another aspect of Western 
countries’ involvement in the region’s conflicts: the extent of 
arms sales to the Middle East. Between 2011 and 2014 - based 
on conservative estimates - Europe earned €21 billion from the 
arms trade with the Middle East while it spent €19 billion on 
hosting approximately one million Syrian refugees. During that 
same period, the US earned at least €18 billion from weapons 
sales, while accepting only about 11,000 Syrian refugees.  
This study aims to address, as much as data availability 
allows, the balance between Westerns countries’ income from 
official weapons export to the Middle East and the cost of 
hosting Syrian refugees fleeing a conflict that has witnessed 
imbrications of most of the region’s countries. Accordingly, we 
will assess the value of official weapons sales between arms 
producing countries and the Middle East between 2011 and 
2014. The focus will be on trade with Jordan, UAE, Qatar, 
Kuwait, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Turkey (abridged as 
JUQKKT), countries that have close links with the Syrian armed 
opposition. We then compare arms sales revenues with the cost 
of hosting Syrian refugees seeking protection in arms-exporting 
countries2 - while taking note that comparing earnings from the 
arms trade with the costs of hosting refugees does not address or 
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assume away the immorality of weapons sales. We grouped 
weapons manufacturers and transfer countries under the ‘Friends 
of Syria’ banner – in reference to the group formed in 2012 by 
former French President Nicolas Sarkozy composed of France, 
UK, US, Germany, Italy, Turkey, UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Jordan, Egypt - and the rest under Eastern Europe. We assess 
JUQKKT’s entire weapons purchases consisting in both the 
build up of their national militaries as well their weapons imports 
intended for delivery to the war in Syria. In our view, it is as 
important to consider the replenishment of JUQKKT’s national 
arsenals, which are key to the repressive regimes contributing to 
the wars and crackdown campaigns of the region. Indeed, over 
the 2012-2016 period, there has been an unprecedented build-up 
of the military arsenal of Gulf countries and Turkey with 
investments significantly increasing the capabilities of their 
armed forces.3   
The focus on Western countries does not imply that they are 
the only weapons exporters to the region. However, reliable data 
on arms exports from China, Russia and Iran are not readily 
available. Nevertheless, we do try to provide some plausible 
estimates based on the very limited data available.4 While this 
prevents us from including these three countries in our 
calculations, it does not impact our main premise of the indirect 
but foreseeable link between Western arms transfer to the 
Middle East and the wave of refugees.  
We based our findings on official national reports, which 
record approved weapons export licenses rather than actual 
weapons shipped to the importing country (except for the case 
of Canada where records reflect actual weapons exports). The 
difference lies in that while export licenses may be approved in 
a given year, delivery may only occur several years down the 
line due to extended production cycles of military equipment. By 
extension, this also indicates that, even if export licenses cease 
to be approved today, weapons will continue to flow to the 
region for years to come. Furthermore, we note that official arms 
sales figures are conservative estimates knowing that at least 
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2%5 of the arms trade is unaccounted for and is conducted 
through behind-the-door deals. As we will also show, there is 
strong evidence of countries exporting to JUQKKT without it 
being reflected in their national records.  
In calculating the cost of hosting refugees starting from 
April 20116, we assumed that governments have continued to 
support refugees from the time of their asylum applications up 
until the end of the period under study (July 2016)7. Also, for 
countries where specific data on the cost of hosting refugees is 
not available, in particular East European countries, we used 
Spain’s per capita cost as a proxy given closer costs of living in 
southern Europe to those in Eastern Europe.8  
 
The following table, graphs and Appendices developed by 
the author will form the basis of our discussion.9 
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Country 
Number 
of 
Refugees 
Income from 
Weapons 
2011-2014  
(€ Billions) 
Ratio of Income 
from Weapons vs 
Cost of Hosting 
Refugees  
Ratio 
including 
2015-2016 
RRPs               
cf. Footnote 9 
Slovakia 64 0.11 283.56x 81.88x 
Croatia 448 0.28 100.22x 100.22x 
Czech Rep. 417 0.17 66.07x 39.55x 
USA 11,883 18.05 49.58x 8.29x 
Spain 9,562 1.64 27.81x 22.08x 
Italy 3,291 1.83 24.10x 19.05x 
UK 9,897 4.93 11.52x 4.87x 
France 12,142 3.09 10.03x 7.83x 
Poland 787 0.10 5.72x 5.72x 
Finland 1,752 0.12 2.74x 1.56x 
Belgium 16,384 1.30 1.84x 1.65x 
Canada [2] 25,000 0.91 1.78x 1.24x 
Austria 40,949 1.58 1.66x 1.62x 
Switzerland 13,282 0.47 1.54x 1.32x 
Bulgaria 18,167 0.13 1.20x 1.19x 
Greece 12,138 0.07 0.97x 0.97x 
Germany 401,018 3.97 0.43x 0.38x 
Sweden 109,044 0.72 0.40x 0.40x 
Netherlands 32,289 0.40 0.25x 0.22x 
Denmark 19,738 0.02 0.02x 0.02x 
Serbia [1] 314,327 0.04 0.02x 0.02x 
Hungary 79,116 0.00 0.01x 0.01x 
Table 1: Country Ranking  
Ranking of countries in terms of ratio of income from the arms trade vs. 
spending on refugees. Countries included in this table are those with more 
than €100 million in weapons exports or with more than 10,000 asylum 
seekers. Most countries earned several times more from the sales of weapons 
than they spent on refugees: the highest profits go to Slovakia which made 
283 times more, while the US earned 50 times more and Spain 28 times more. 
Greece broke even and others such as Sweden, Slovenia and Portugal spent 
slightly more on refugees.10 
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Based on our calculations, since 2011, Europe, the US and 
Canada have spent around €20.1 billion to host approximately 
one million Syrian refugees over five years. At the same time, 
Western arms manufacturers are benefitting from an increase in 
military equipment supplied to the Middle East, a considerable 
number of which has ended up in the war in Syria. Comments by 
UNHCR’s Europe Director are quite telling: the weapons 
industry “kills and creates refugees”11. 
 
“Friends of Syria”: Traditional proponents of the weapons 
industry 
The primary source of weapons to the Middle East remains by 
far the United States, which has historically - at best - 
misassessed the consequences of its foreign policy across the 
region. Leading European democracies are second to the US in 
arms trade to the region (until 2014) and are quick to entertain 
the largest Middle Eastern arms purchasers. Looking closer at 
governments’ policy in terms of the arms trade, it seems that 
international law and national regulations become malleable.  
With the onset of the ‘Arab Spring’, Western governments 
and think tanks were enthusiastic about the prospects of 
democratization in the Middle East. Nevertheless, one year after 
the ‘Arab Spring’, EU and US licensed arms sales to the region 
increased by 22%12 and 300%13 respectively.14 Several Gulf 
regimes, troubled by the tide sweeping the region, launched a 
counter-revolutionary campaign. The West played right into this 
campaign through, among other ways, the supply of military 
equipment. Arms imports by Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait 
increased respectively by 212%, 245% and 174% between the 
periods of 2007-2011 and 2012-2016; UAE’s purchases 
increased by 63% with continuous high levels of imports since 
2001.15 The war in Syria represents an extension of this trend: 
since the start of the conflict, Western-made weapons have been 
transferred to various Syrian opposition groups fighting the 
Syrian regime as well as each other.16  
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The Obama administration’s involvement in the Syrian war 
has been criticized for being ‘hands off’. At the same time, 
official involvement includes direct delivery of non-lethal 
weapons to rebel groups. Evidence indicates that Washington 
also seems to relinquish the transfer of lethal equipment to its 
Arab allies, yet tacitly approves Syria as final destination.17 
Evidently, US manufactured TOW missiles,18 previously sold to 
Saudi Arabia and Turkey, frequently appear in videos shot by 
Syrian rebels. We would thus argue that America’s imbrication 
in the war is rather substantial: in February 2017, the Financial 
Times reports19 of a Syrian rebel commander who was on the 
one hand coordinating weapons transfers and salary payments to 
the Free Syrian Army (a loosely defined group) in Syria while 
also acting as a CIA informant. The commander explains that 
regular planning meetings with US and other representatives 
were held at the covert operations room in Turkey known as 
Müşterek Operasyon Merkezi, modeled after the one in Jordan. 
There, commanders “regularly inflated their forces’ numbers to 
pocket extra salaries, and some jacked up weapons requests to 
hoard or sell on the black market. Inevitably, much of that ended 
up in ISIS hands. Other groups cut in Jabhat al-Nusra on deals 
to keep it from attacking them.” According to the now 
unemployed commander, the CIA and everyone else was aware 
of such practices, which were “the price of doing business.”20  
Furthermore, one of the latest revelation of US contribution 
in sustaining the war comes in the form of a leaked audio 
recording21 of former Secretary of State John Kerry who 
acknowledged “putting an extraordinary amount of arms in 
[rebel hands]” before noting that the US could send even more 
weapons but that it could be destructive for the armed opposition 
as it would drive “everyone [to up] the ante”. In addition, the war 
has benefited US weapons industry: at an annual conference, 
Lockheed Martin’s Executive Vice President Bruce Tanner is 
recorded22 explaining the benefit from the war in Syria where he 
highlights the ‘unexpected’ upsurge in demand for support of the 
F-22 Raptor aircraft and other products in follow-up to the 
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shooting down of the Russian aircraft by the Turkish air force. 
He added that Lockheed Martin, through its equipment, aims to 
heed the consequent increase in danger for US over-flights of 
Syrian territory. He also underscored that the company’s 
increase in earnings is due to UAE’s and Saudi Arabia’s 
involvement in the war in Yemen.  
Along the same lines, reports surfaced in 2012 that Syrian 
rebel groups23 used Swiss-made hand grenades initially sold to 
the United Arab Emirates. As a result, Bern decreased its arms 
exports to UAE from €132 million in 2012 to €10 million the 
following year, yet increased it again to €14 million in 2014. 
Weapons produced in Belgium were also transported24 to the 
various warring factions in Syria. Switzerland, which prides 
itself in being a harbinger of peace, earned between 2011 and 
2014 from weapons sales to the region 1.5 times what it spent on 
hosting 13,000 Syrian refugees. Similarly, while Belgium’s 
revenues from arms sales to Saudi Arabia and UAE amounted to 
€1.18 billion, it spent €0.71 billion on hosting 16,000 Syrian 
refugees. For other arm producing countries, these ratios are 
astoundingly higher as will be shown below. 
We note here that the EU implemented an arms embargo as 
well as other restrictive measures on Syria from May 2011 to 
May 2013, with several amendments and extensions25. Its aim 
was mainly to prevent the export of equipment used in the 
violent repression by government forces while allowing the 
supply of non-lethal equipment to the Syrian National Coalition 
for Opposition and Revolutionary Forces. The European Council 
declared in May 2013 it would review its position before 1 
August 2013, which however never took place. We note that this 
arms embargo was quite lax in nature, as it has been 
continuously breached. Based on an interview with the former 
Head of the European Union Delegation to Syria from 2013 to 
201626, the EU decision not to reconvene on the subject points 
to a tacit policy of consent on the status quo of weapons 
deliveries to the Syrian National Coalition and their armed 
affiliates on the ground. Also, according to the former official, 
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the embargo’s two-year timeframe at the time of adoption was 
set based on the misguided perception of the imminent fall of 
Bashar Al-Asad.  
 
 
 
 
Based on our findings, ‘Friends of Syria’ earned €31.88 
billions in weapons sales to JUQKKT and spent €10.45 billions 
on hosting Syrian refugees. Discounting Germany’s numbers, 
the US, France, UK, and Italy made €27.92 billion in sales versus 
€1.18 billion spent on refugees, i.e. they earned 23 times more 
from weapons sales.  
Western European and US officials defend weapons sales 
on various grounds. For the German Chancellor, the market is 
strategic: the Merkel Doctrine27 defends the export of weapons 
as an essential instrument for peacekeeping in countries where 
Germany is not directly active but has vested interests. 
Accordingly, the Chancellor calls for sustained arms deliveries 
in order for partners to carry out common objectives. This 
included a 2011 deal, unthinkable under previous 
governments28, selling 270 modern tanks to Saudi Arabia, with 
tacit Israeli approval. Furthermore, German commentators may 
worry that were Germany to refrain from exporting weapons, 
27.92
31.88
1.18
10.45
Western Friends-of-Syria excl.
Germany
Western Friends-of-Syria
Graph 2: Friends-of-Syria Weapon Sales vs. Spending on  
Refugees
Estimated spending on hosting refugees April 2011-July 2016 (€ Billions)
Revenues from official weapons sales 2011-2014 (€ Billions) 
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others counties will not hesitate to. German journalist Jürgen 
Grässlin argues29 however that the opposite is in fact true: when 
the Dutch parliament refused to export used Leopard tanks to 
Indonesia, Germany jumped in and approved the same deal. In 
the meantime, German opposition groups have called for a 
blanket ban on arms sales to Saudi Arabia over its human rights 
violations. This drove the Chancellor and Economy Minister 
Sigmar Gabriel to “critically review” arms sales to Riyadh and 
decided in 201530 to focus exports to Saudi Arabia on 
“defensive” military gear, including all-terrain armored vehicles, 
aerial refueling systems, combat jet parts, patrol boats, and 
drones. Still, German exports to Saudi Arabia increased31 from 
€179 million to €484 million in the first half of 2016. While 
Germany has been applauded for taking in the majority of 
Europe’s Syrian refugees (about 400,000), it should be pointed 
out that Germany’s weapons industry has and continues to profit 
from conflicts in the Middle East prolonged by arms exports. 
One could argue that Germany’s perceived generosity in hosting 
refugees comes at a high cost to Syrians.  
Other arguments for military exports advance threats to the 
domestic labor market in case of implementing restrictions on 
the weapons industry. As such, not only industry-affiliated 
think-tanks but also mainstream media explicitly endorse the 
sale of weapons: long-time CNN news anchor, Wolf Blitzer32 
expressed concern about the possibility of halting sales to Saudi 
Arabia. In his view, the consequent risk of job losses across US 
defense contractors by far outweighs the moral argument of 
supporting Saudi war crimes in Yemen. Beyond the moral 
aspect, Wolf Blitzer overrates the industry’s job creation 
potential. In many countries in fact, the arms industry is a dying 
sector in need of government subsidies: in Germany, the industry 
employs 100,000 people while the renewable energy sector, 
where skills could be transferred, is currently creating 300,00033 
jobs yearly. In the case of the US, allocating national spending 
to the clean energy, health or education sectors would create 
between 50 to 140%34 more jobs than spending it on the military. 
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Other officials counter-intuitively advocate for Western 
weapons sales based on humanitarian grounds. UK Foreign 
Secretary Boris Johnson said35 that were the UK to stop 
supplying Saudi Arabia, “other Western countries […] would 
happily supply arms with nothing like the same compunctions or 
criteria or respect for humanitarian law [as the UK]”. Some UK 
ministers have also said that Saudi Arabia, which has cleared its 
own military from any violations in the war in Yemen, is best 
placed to investigate its own alleged war crimes with Boris 
Johnson adding “the Saudi government has approached this 
matter with great seriousness36, and the seriousness it deserves”. 
Moreover, the UK’s former business secretary Vince Cable 
recently said he was mislead37 by the Ministry of Defense in 
signing off on the sale of laser-guided Paveway IV missiles to 
be used in Saudi Arabia’s bombing of Yemen. Cable initially 
blocked the export license due to concerns for civilian deaths, 
yet was promised “oversight of potential targets” which the 
Ministry now denies.  
Lastly, for some politicians, the case for weapons exports is 
made on a purely monetary basis. Former UK Prime Minister 
David Cameron boasted38 of his efforts to help sell “brilliant 
things” such as Eurofighter Typhoons to Saudi Arabia, on the 
same day the European Parliament voted for an arms embargo 
on Saudi Arabia over its bombardment of Yemen. His successor, 
Theresa May carried over a position in defense of weapons 
exports and said that London’s close relationship with Riyadh 
played a vital role in the fight against terrorism and that the Saudi 
regime’s co-operation was “helping keep people on the streets of 
Britain safe.”39 Ironically, politicians who are the most candid 
about using the threat of refugees as a scaremongering tactic are 
also the most ardent defenders of the weapons industry: UKIP’s 
Nigel Farage is a case in point. 
In the case of France, ties with Saudi Arabia seem at an all 
time high40 with President Hollande awarding Crown Prince 
Mohammed ben Nayef the Légion d’Honneur for Riyadh’s 
efforts ‘fighting terrorism and extremism’. With over €3 billion 
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in sales to Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan and 
Turkey, France41 has spent ten times less (€0.31 billion) on 
hosting approximately 12,000 Syrian refugees. For Italy, Prime 
Minister, Matteo Renzi, propones exempting defense equipment 
manufacturers from paying VAT42 and allowing the industry to 
apply for EU research grants. Italy made an astounding 24 ratio 
in arms sales compared to its spending on 3,300 Syrian refugees. 
The majority of Western leaders in countries with powerful 
military industries defend their weapons manufacturing 
companies. They seem to however disregard any correlation of 
their national arms exports with refugees fleeing conflicts. 
Rather, for the most part, they express a varying range of 
contempt, disdain, or increasingly, xenophobia towards the 
waves of people seeking refuge. In countries welcoming asylum 
seekers, refugees are expected to assume the mantel of 
indebtedness towards their hosts, despite the fact that they are 
asylees by necessity and in part as a consequence of their hosts’ 
economic gains.  
 
New kids on the block: Revival of E. Europe’s weapons 
industry 
Through the recent boost in arms trade to the Middle East, East 
European countries have opened the doors to weapons stock 
from former Yugoslavia and have revived their domestic 
weapons industries. At the same time, refugees on their soil are 
treated with considerable levels of discrimination.  
An investigation43 published in July 2016 by the Balkan 
Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) and the Organized 
Crime and Corruption Reporting Project indicates that eight East 
Europeans countries (Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Montenegro, Slovakia, Serbia and Romania) have 
since 2012 approved weapons and ammunition exports in value 
of just under €1.2 billion to Saudi Arabia (€806m), Jordan 
(€155m), UAE (€135m) and Turkey (€87m). 
As indicated by the investigation, Saudi Arabia, the largest 
purchaser of these deals, does not count East Europeans 
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countries as a traditional source for the replenishment of its 
military arsenal – it rather opts for more modern US equipment44 
such as the Abram battle tank. Yet, since 2012, there is a surge 
of arms exports from Eastern Europe to Riyadh, which arguably 
is not intended for the country’s national forces. In fact, the 
BIRN report indicates that these East European exports, mainly 
destined for Syria, are distributed by Saudi Arabia to its regional 
allies, Jordan and Turkey45 who steer two command hubs 
transferring the weapons by road or through airdrops into Syria. 
Gradually, ex-Yugoslav-made weapons started appearing46 in 
the hands of a plethora of armed groups around Syria’s 
battlefields. This has been documented by Eliot Higgins, an 
investigative journalist and researcher specializing in open-
source investigations, writing under the name of Brown Moses47, 
who has mapped the weapons’ spread throughout the conflict.  
Accordingly, Belgrade, Zagreb, Bratislava and Sofia have 
become main export hubs to the Middle East. Specifically, in 
2015 Serbia agreed to €135 million of arms48 export licenses to 
Saudi Arabia. Back in 2013, Serbia had rejected similar requests 
for fear weapons would be diverted to Syria; these were worth 
$22 million based on Serbia’s national reports.49 Also in 2013, 
the Serbian government denied four arms and military 
equipment import applications from the United Kingdom, 
Bulgaria, Belarus, and the Czech Republic. These import worth 
$9.9 million were intended for re-sales (in the form of exports) 
to Saudi Arabia.50At a press conference in August 2016 
following the BIRN investigation, Serbian Prime Minister 
Aleksandar Vucic said that, while he was defense minister in 
2013, he “probably received” intelligence that arms could end 
up in Syria. “Do not ask me what has changed. In 2015, I was 
not defense minister and I can’t know [what happened]. I will 
take a look,” he said. Vucic was candid about the benefit of the 
arms trade and said at the 2016 press conference: “I adore it 
when we export arms because it is a pure influx of foreign 
currency.” 
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Serbia’s involvement in the seemingly lucrative production 
and transfer of weapons to the Middle East is also attracting new 
partnerships51: in 2013 UAE invested $33 million in the first 
phase of a joint development project of the Advanced Light 
Attack System missile system, one of the most modern land 
forces. The project will consist of a total of $220 million invested 
over a period of four years. Moreover, and as an additional point 
of interest regarding the indirect forces at play in the Syrian 
theater, a Serbian-owned consortium,52 CPR Impex, one of the 
region’s most important arms brokers,53 and Israel’s ATL 
Atlantic Technology bought Montenegro Defence Industry 
(MDI) in February 2015. Since August 2015, MDI arranged 
export deals of 250 tons of ammunition and 10,000 anti-tank 
systems to Saudi Arabia in value of over €2.7 million. At the 
time of writing, MDI is under investigation by Montenegro’s 
special prosecution for organised crime and corruption over it’s 
alleged arms trading with Libya, Ukraine and Saudi Arabia, and 
the credibility of the end-user certificates, especially with 
countries under an international arms embargo.54 We note that 
prior to 2015 and since 200655 (availability of reports), 
Montenegro had not conducted any significant arms trade with 
the Middle East except for Israel, where the end user country was 
stated to be Afghanistan, Iraq or USA, and with Yemen in 2010. 
We also highlight here that the recent rapprochement between 
Serbia and the UAE has been achieved thanks in part to the close 
involvement of Mohammed Dahlan,56 a former Palestinian 
official close to UAE’s top leadership, who facilitated the arms 
trade between both countries. In 2015 Mohammed Dahlan and 
his family (as well as his political connections and business 
partners) were awarded Serbian citizenship as a “sign of 
gratitude for” the rapprochement with UAE. Dahlan and his wife 
were also awarded Montenegrin citizenship in 2010.57 
In Bratislava, public broadcaster Slovak Radio and 
Television reported that in 2015 Slovakia exported to Saudi 
Arabia 40,000 assault rifles, more than 1,000 mortars, 14 rocket 
launchers, almost 500 heavy machine guns and more than 1,500 
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RPGs. The Prime Minister defended the arms deal noting “if we 
don’t sell [arms], somebody else will, but don’t come crying to 
me if a lack of arms deals causes the loss of jobs for our 
people.”58 Slovakia welcomed 64 Syrian refugees costing 
Bratislava €400 thousands, translating into a 284 ratio of 
weapons sales to cost of hosting refugees. 
For Croatia, data indicates that in 2013 and 2014 Zagreb 
sold over €155 million in ammunition to Saudi Arabia and €115 
million to Jordan.59 We note that such deals do not follow regular 
trade patterns as, specifically for Jordan and based on official 
reports, there is little history of weapon exports between Zagreb 
and Amman: previous arms deals consisted of fifteen pistols 
worth USD $1053 sold to Jordan in 2001. More recently, the 
OCCRP reports that in December 2012 alone, exports to Jordan 
amounted to over USD$6.5 millions.60 The New York Times 
also reported 36 round-trip flights conducted between Amman 
and Zagreb from December 2012 through February 2013 where 
Jordanian cargo aircrafts airlifted a large Saudi purchase of 
infantry arms from Zagreb to Amman.61 As Croatia’s national 
reports do not indicate any exports to Jordan in 2012 one can 
safely assume the existence of under-the-table deals, which go 
unreported. A considerable amount of Croatian-made weapons 
has been documented in the hands of rebel groups such as the 
Al-Nusra affiliated Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement. More 
recently Elliot Higgings confirmed that both ISIS and Jabhat Al-
Nusra are using Croatian-made weapons, although “how they 
acquired them is unclear. They could have been looted from 
other groups, sold between groups, or provided directly.”62 
As for Bulgaria, the largest state-run arms producer, VMZ-
Sopot has also hit the jackpot: after being insolvent in 2008, the 
plant has been working at full capacity since 2015.63 It paid off 
around €11 million in debt and has created 1,200 new jobs. 
Furthermore, sales growth went from around €19 million in the 
first half of 2015 to around €86 million in the first half of 2016. 
VMZ Sopot’s net profit surged to around €600,000 from a net 
loss of €35 million in the same period. While Bulgaria took in 
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18,000 Syrian refugees, a 2015 report by the German Pro Asyl 
foundation entitled “Humiliated, ill-treated and without 
protection” provides shocking accounts from asylum seekers in 
Bulgaria.64 Refugees are subject to inhumane and degrading 
treatment by police and prison guards including extortion, abuse 
as well as torture.  
Based on reports by Balkan Insight, Bulgaria’s government 
issued export permits for munitions and military equipment sales 
worth €85.5 million to Saudi Arabia in 2014 — including 
ammunition worth €65.4 million, large caliber weapons valued 
at €12.5 million and small calibre weapons (€5 million).65 
According to Ben Moores, a senior analyst at defence 
consultancy IHS Janes, such type of weapons were “very 
unlikely to be used by the Saudi military” but are very heavily 
used in Yemen, Iraq and in Syria. The director of the British-
based consultancy group Armament Research Services also 
confirmed this in pointing to “notable quantities of arms and 
munitions produced in Bulgaria […being] documented in 
Syria.”  
As is the case with Croatia, Saudi Arabia has not been a 
major customer for Bulgarian weapons until 2014. According to 
a former Bulgarian military officer, the flights between Sofia and 
Tabuk, Saudi Arabia transported Bulgarian weapons, which 
were shipped by land to a distribution center in Jordan for Syrian 
opposition forces. In a BBC interview in late October 2015, 
Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir openly acknowledged his 
country’s supply of arms to Syrian opposition fighters aimed at 
“[contributing] to changing the balance of the power on the 
ground.” Furthermore, Bulgaria was considerably involved in 
the US “Train and Equip” program intended to ready Syrian 
rebels whom Washington vetted as “moderate” for battles 
against the Syrian regime and ISIS. The US Special Operations 
Command, in charge of the US military support to Syrian rebels 
contracted a Bulgarian based company for over €24.6 million in 
December 2014 to supply foreign weapons and ammunition.  
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Through indirect transfer of considerable weapons 
quantities to rebel factions, East European countries have 
acquired an unexpected but important role in the war in Syria, 
one driven by monetary benefits. Nonetheless, East European 
countries are quick to encourage and push Syrian refugees 
towards continental Europe while accepting a symbolic number 
of asylum seekers. We note that this block of countries does not 
hold known political or strategic interests in the Middle East, 
neither now or in the past when they have been historically 
absent from the region’s major conflicts.     
With regards to Russia, Moscow has historically been a 
major weapons supplier to the Syrian government – despite 
limited availability of data – we know that at least 10% of its 
arms exports went to Syria. “Russia reportedly has $1.5 billion 
worth of ongoing arms contracts with Syria for various missile 
systems and upgrades to tanks and aircraft, reportedly doubling 
that investment in small arms sales since the beginning of the 
Syrian civil war”. Furthermore, military training provided by 
Russia since the beginning of the conflict ought to also be 
quantified. Despite the very direct role Russia has played in the 
Syrian war, the country has currently only accepted 1,395 Syrian 
refugees on temporary asylum and has even deported one Syrian 
refugee.66 Still, Russia’s armed forces benefited from the war in 
Syria: in his February 2017 speech at the Lower House of 
Parliament, the Russian defense minister, Sergei Shoigu, 
reported that 162 samples of modernized armament have been 
tested during the war in Syria, including new jets - Su-30SM and 
Su-34 - as well as Mi-28N and Ka-52 helicopters.67 Syria also 
has been the testing ground for high-precision munitions, sea-
based cruise missiles, used for the first time in combat. 
Furthermore, the defense minister noted that close to all of the 
flight personnel of the Russian Aerospace Forces, 86% of them, 
including 75% of the crews of long-range aviation, 79% of 
tactical aviation, 88% of military transport and 89% of army 
aviation, have received combat experience in Syria.  
 
Syria Studies   49 
 
Centre for Syrian Studies – University of St Andrews, 2017 
 
Cases of one-time weapons exporters & regular component 
suppliers  
In the previous sections we have highlighted how Middle 
Eastern countries have purchased record high amounts of 
weapons from traditional and non-traditional arms manufacturer 
and directed considerable amounts of those to their allies in 
Syria. In this section, we will aim to provide a brief overview of 
some covert transfers and flows of weapons into Syria. Such an 
overview will be non-exhaustive by definition given the 
underground nature of and limited availability of sources on the 
subject. We note that such transfers are not accounted for in 
national export figures and form a significant part of the illicit 
weapons trade sustaining the war in Syria. This further 
underscores the premise of the conservative estimate of national 
arms trade figures, which we relied upon for our study.   
 
Transfers by third party states under civil strife 
There is evidence of weapons transfer from countries with 
ongoing conflict where government authority is limited and 
exports controls are lackluster. As such, Libyan missiles, looted 
during the 2011 upheaval were reportedly bound for Syria 
through Lebanon: according to an investigation by the UN Panel 
of Experts on Libya, Lebanese authorities seized on 27 April 
2012 a shipment of various arms and ammunition on board the 
Letfallah II cargo ship near the port of Tripoli, Lebanon. The 
Panel concluded that Belgian-made FN Herstal FAL rifles found 
on the ship are “likely to be part of materiel deliveries made by 
Qatar during the uprising [in Libya]” which had “since been 
illicitly transferred out of Libya, including towards other conflict 
zones”. According to the Panel, these rifles were loaded with a 
type of Pakistani ammunition that had been previously supplied 
by Qatar to Libya and had also been found on board the Letfallah 
II. Knowing that Syria did not purchase Belgian FN Herstal FAL 
rifles after 1969, the use of post-1969 models by the Syrian 
armed opposition groups and ISIS fighters suggests they may 
have come from an external source.68  
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Similarly, according to a 2014 study conducted by the Small 
Arms Survey on the proliferation of Man Portable Air Defence 
Systems in Syria69, some MANPADS in rebel hands were 
smuggled into Syria, including Chinese FN-6 systems not known 
to be exported to the Syrian government. Sudan was identified 
as a possible source of such missiles, which were reportedly 
purchased by Qatar and shipped through Turkey. Sudan is in fact 
among a handful of known importers of FN-6 MANPADS and 
in view of the widespread proliferation of Sudanese weapons and 
ammunition among armed groups. Similarly, the Conflict 
Armament Research (CAR) report of February 2015 
documenting material seized from ISIS during the battle of 
Kobane between 2014-2015 provides evidence of Chinese rifles, 
which had their identification obliterated.70 The same 
configuration of weapons had been found in South Sudan.  
 
IED components consistently supplied to ISIS 
According to Amnesty International, the majority of weapons 
seized by ISIS originate from looted Iraqi government stock. 
Still the group’s large arsenal seems to originate from 25 
different countries.71 
Following two years of investigation into ISIS’ weapons in Iraq 
and Syria, Conflict Armament Research revealed in its February 
2016 report that Turkey is the most important source of 
components used to manufacture the majority of ISIS’ 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs).72 These consist of 
chemical precursors including a mixture of aluminum and 
nitrate-based fertilizer such as ammonium nitrate, as well as 
containers, detonating cord, cables, and wires. The investigation 
found that such elements were manufactured by or sold through 
13 Turkish companies/intermediaries before being acquired by 
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. CAR notes that most of the 
companies involved serve the Turkish market and do not export 
goods to Iraq or Syria.  The report also highlights the speed at 
which ISIS forces acquire IED materials, at times as little as one 
month following their lawful supply to commercial entities, 
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which speaks to the lack of monitoring by national governments 
and of companies alike according to the report.73 While the trade 
itself is conducted lawfully, it is the smaller commercial entities 
transferring the materials to groups affiliated with ISIS forces, 
which “appear to be the weakest links in the chain of custody.” 
Additionally, in a related report on ISIS’ weapons manufacturing 
in Mosul, CAR research “provides stark evidence of an 
extremely robust procurement network” with consistent 
acquisition of identical products from the same sources, “almost 
exclusively from the Turkish domestic market.”74  
 
Private individuals trading weapons 
News articles abound with evidence of arms also being 
smuggled into Syria through private deals. Balkan Insight 
reported on one such case: Bulgarian weapons were reported to 
be trucked into Homs in August 2012 and paid for by a Syrian 
businessman in the amount of €1.4 million for AK-47 rifles, 
grenade launchers and ammunition.75  A former Syrian 
opposition fighter said he was involved in 12 transfers of 
Bulgarian weapons as of 2013, the largest of which was worth 
€6.4 million. The shipments were delivered at the Turkish-
Syrian border in two trucks and were arranged by Syrian and 
Turkish nationals with connections to Bulgarian arms dealers.  
 
Transfers possibly in breach of international weapons 
embargos 
The Conflict and Armament Report of 2015 documented various 
Iranian cartridges, which the People’s Protection Units (YPG) 
ceased from ISIS forces in Kobane. Most of these cartridges 
have been manufactured in 2006, with some as recently as 2013. 
Their presence outside Iran may indicate a violation of UN 
Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006), which prohibits 
Iranian exports of weapons and related products to all 
countries.76  
In addition to weapons transfers sanctioned by national 
governments in support of rebel factions in Syria, arms and 
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component smuggling and transfer from private groups and 
companies into Syrian territory add to the plethora of entities 
with stakes in the war in Syria. The acknowledgment of these 
illicit activities by governments and halting the flow of weapons 
and funds sustaining the war would be the first step in containing 
the drain of Syrians from Syria.  
 
A Dishonest Debate – for the most part 
Weapons industries are by and large applauded for turning the 
wheels of the economy at home. Little scrutiny is however 
carried out over the consequences it is creating elsewhere in the 
world. In the last few years, with unprecedented quantities of 
weapons sold to the Middle East including those transferred to 
Syria, the conflict has driven millions of Syrians to seek refuge 
in Western countries. Aware of the consequences of weapons 
proliferation, European politicians may have opted for a 
tradeoff: making their taxpayers shoulder the short term cost of 
hosting refugees in exchange for profits to the arms industry. 
With reality of wars hitting closer to home, time may be 
opportune for a different debate in Western capitals. 
According to the former economic adviser to the president 
of the European Commission, Philippe Legrain, refugees are in 
fact unlikely to decrease wages or raise unemployment for native 
workers. Most significantly, calculations indicate that while the 
absorption of so many refugees will increase public debt for the 
EU by almost €69 billion between 2015 and 2020, during the 
same period refugees will help GDP grow by €126.6 billion.77 In 
fact, a €1 investment in welcoming refugees can yield nearly €2 
in economic benefits within five years. Legrain also highlights 
how refugees could solve an impending demographic challenge 
in Europe. Along these lines, Portugal considers the refugee 
influx as an opportunity to revive some regions of the country.78 
Lisbon is in fact offering to welcome up to 5,800 more refugees 
in addition to the 4,500 it already agreed to take in as part of the 
European Union’s refugee quota system. Portugal has ‘only’ 
sold €500,000 worth of weapons to the Middle East.  
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We thus deem the debate over the flows of refugees and the 
heavy burden on societies as flawed. Some European and North 
American societies unjustly blame refugees for fleeing war and 
seeking stability. By hosting them, they draw asylum seekers 
into financial and/or emotional indebtedness towards these 
societies. Yet these same societies, for the most part, disregard 
Western countries’ complicity in cashing in on the wars refugees 
are escaping. Even more so, the question remains as to the 
distribution of profits from the global arms trade between 
national governments brokering the deals and arms 
manufacturers, knowing that it is the former who covers the cost 
of resettling refugees.79 Rather than at refugees, anger and 
protest should thus be directed towards the weapons industries 
and the revolving doors linking them to policy makers. The latter 
ought to face greater opposition to the war-profiting policies they 
espouse. 
While this study focused on the case of Syrian refugees and 
the war in Syria, other conflicts in the Middle East deserve as 
much scrutiny. Arms sales by the US, Canada, Germany, UK 
and France feeding conflicts in Iraq, Yemen and Libya should 
also be taken into account in calculating the debt the West has 
towards the Iraqi, Libyan and Yemeni people. The sole reason 
keeping Yemenis from joining Syrian refugees in Europe and 
beyond is that Yemen is landlocked by Saudi Arabia on the one 
hand and by a naval blockade on the other. Over 3 million 
Yemenis are currently internally displaced and over 14 million 
are food insecure.80 
The sustained economic, political and military support of 
Western democracies to Arab rulers of the Middle East, ranging 
from the repressive, autocratic and most regressive regimes, 
remains the main guarantor for drawn-out wars and sustained 
impoverishment of the region’s populations. Such continuous 
support trumps any inherent cultural or religious characteristics, 
which may be advanced as endogenous reasons for the Middle 
East’s seeming inability for progress. Western military 
equipment guaranteed to the Gulf is an essential element of the 
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Gulf-led counter-revolution aimed at repressing citizens and 
residents of these countries. The concentration of national 
resources in the military industry and away from more 
productive sectors limits the advancement of these societies.  
Such militarization is both fueled by and feeds the region’s 
escalating power interplays and contributes to the cycle of 
violence and subjugation, ensuring an omnipresent -or at 
minimum- looming threat of war.  As we have outlined, there is 
considerable monetary return from the military aspect of such 
support. Still, the West and its local clients seemingly agree on 
the ensuing political benefits which remain as important: citizens 
of Gulf countries do not get to question the standing of their 
rulers and the unabated flow of oil to the West, while the deep-
rooted support of the Palestinian cause against Israeli occupation 
and oppression remains subdued. 
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